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ORIGINAL PAPER
Organizing the Unexpected: How Civil Society Organizations
Dealt with the Refugee Crisis
Michael Meyer1 • Ruth Simsa1
 The Author(s) 2018
Abstract The capability of organizations to respond to
unexpected events has been investigated from different
theoretical angles: organizational learning, improvisation,
ambidexterity, resilience, to name but a few. These con-
cepts, however, hardly ever refer to structural characteris-
tics. Against this backdrop, the aim of this paper is twofold.
First, based on systems and organizational learning theory,
it will theoretically link the characteristics of organiza-
tional structure with organizational responses to unex-
pected external jolts, thus contributing to better understand
the reactions of organizations to the unexpected. Second, it
will empirically illustrate the relation of organizational
structure with organizational responses by investigating
how Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) in Austria reacted
to the unexpected inflow of refugees from Central Europe.
In 2015, CSOs accepted a wide range of responsibilities
and worked together with government entities to provide
shelter, catering, and transport for almost one million
refugees. Based on participant observations during opera-
tion, in-depth interviews (2015 and 2016) and focus groups
with decision-makers (2017), we will sketch three longi-
tudinal case studies of organizations with very different
structures, concentrating on the processes and operations
they developed during the crisis. Our findings show that
their responses are closely related to their structure,
specifically to the flexibility and the stability of structural
elements. Remarkable changes took place in all
organizations investigated. Initial responses and first
structural changes occurred mainly where the structure
already allowed for flexibility. Yet in the long run, the
adaptations also impacted the stable structural elements.
Keywords Organizational flexibility  External jolts 
Refugees  Resilience  Systems theory
Introduction
How do organizations respond properly to unexpected
shocks and jolts? These questions have been discussed
from different theoretical angles: organizational learning
(Argyris and Scho¨n 1978, 1996), dynamic capabilities
(Eisenhardt and Martin 2000; Zollo and Winter 2002),
organizational ambidexterity (Gibson and Birkinshaw
2004; He and Wong 2004), organizational improvisation
(Moorman and Miner 1998; Pina e Cunha et al. 2015), and
more recently organizational resilience (Lissack and
Letiche 2002; Sutcliffe and Vogus 2003; Va¨likangas 2010).
Another strand of the literature analyzes how organizations
handle disasters and hazards (e.g., Grothe-Hammer and
Berthod 2017; Kreps and Bosworth 1993; Lindell 2013).
All these concepts emphasize organizational capabilities
and processes of learning and adaptation, yet rarely refer to
organizational structure.
The goal of the study is to analyze and discuss how
responses of organizations are related to structural char-
acteristics. In our understanding, structure is more than
positions in an organizational chart. It embraces all devices
that allocate, coordinate, and supervise activities directed
toward the achievement of organizational aims (Pugh et al.
1968). Based on systems theory, the organizational learn-
ing framework and an empirical investigation, we relate
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organizations’ responses to structural preconditions, in
particular, to their redundancy and variety. The ‘‘unex-
pected’’ refers to a relevant change in an organization’s
environment that, for different reasons, had not been
anticipated but required organizational reactions. Envi-
ronmental jolts are defined as transient perturbations whose
effects on organizations are disruptive and potentially
inimical (Meyer 1982). Consequently, variations of struc-
tures are necessary. Likewise, to safeguard organizational
identity and capacity for action, some structural elements
must be retained. For dealing with this balance between
stability and flexibility in stressful situations, social sys-
tems theory is particularly useful as it refers to the crucial
importance of redundancy and variety for understanding
organizations’ decisions (Luhmann 1984, 1988, 2003).
We illustrate our theoretical assumptions with an
empirical study of Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) in
the so-called refugee crisis of 2015/16 in Austria. By
spontaneously offering a wide range of services to refu-
gees, CSOs had to deal with unforeseen and severe changes
in their environment. Based on their main domains of
redundancy, three different organizations were selected to
study organizational changes and non-changes, and to
relate the findings to our theoretical concept.
Following Luhmann’s (1988) model, we conceptualize
organizational structure as decision premises in three
dimensions: programs, communication channels, and per-
sons. We assume that organizations’ reactions toward the
unexpected are related to their flexibility and stability in
these dimensions. We further draw on organizational
learning theory and its different levels of learning (e.g.,
Argyris and Scho¨n 1978; Bateson 1972; Chiva and Habib
2015). Choosing systems theory as theoretical basis has
specific methodological implications: Communications and
decisions rather than actions must be the relevant research
objects, applying operative constructivism without claim of
objectivity and an exploratory attitude toward distinctions
regarded as relevant by the respective system instead of
testing a hypothesis (Besio and Pronzini 2011).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In
the next chapter, we summarize prior research on organi-
zational responses to disasters, crises, and external jolts.
We then elaborate on systems theory, describing its
understanding of autopoiesis, organizational structure, and
particularly, the forms of decision premises that help
organizations balance redundancy and variety. For devel-
oping our analytical frame, we will then amalgamate
concepts from systems theory with organizational learning.
After sketching out the empirical context, we present the
findings from our three longitudinal case studies. Finally,
we discuss our findings and argue how they might inspire
further research.
Literature Review
Organizations’ capabilities to deal with abrupt changes in
their environment have been investigated from different
theoretical angles. The literature on strategic management
developed the concepts of dynamic capabilities (Eisenhardt
and Martin 2000) and ambidexterity (Gibson and Birkin-
shaw 2004). Both suggest that organizations need to bal-
ance between routine operations and innovative activities,
informed by March’s (1991) basic distinction between
exploitation and exploration. In research on organizational
resilience (Hamel and Valikangas 2003; Va¨likangas 2010;
Weick and Sutcliffe 2011), the question is rather how
organizations can undergo deep change without or prior to
a crisis, e.g., making their structure more robust or creating
a culture that helps them to adapt.
In the organizational learning literature (Argyris and
Scho¨n 1978, 1996; Fiol and Lyles 1985), the question
arises how organizations can learn from disasters and other
rare events (Cooke and Rohleder 2006; Starbuck 2009;
Starbuck and Farjoun 2009; Twigg and Steiner 2002).
Empirical research on emergency and disaster response
organizations (e.g., Carley and Harrald 1997; Grothe-
Hammer and Berthod 2017), e.g., in US coal mining
(Madsen 2009), the NASA space shuttle accidents, airplane
crashes, and similar significant accidents (e.g., Cooke and
Rohleder 2006), rather questions the probability of learning
from unique events (Starbuck 2009). Nevertheless, unex-
pected jolts may work as unfreezing events for organiza-
tions, triggering significant organizational change (Carley
and Harrald 1997).
In their typology of organized responses to disaster,
Kreps and Bosworth (2007) distinguish between tasks and
structural responses: Tasks may be regular or irregular;
structure can be old or new. They differentiate between
four types of responses: (1) established, i.e., regular tasks
based on old structure, (2) extending, i.e., non-regular tasks
based on old structure, (3) expanding, i.e., regular tasks
based on new structure, and (4) emergent, when non-reg-
ular tasks are executed with a new structure. The authors
further argue that organized responses require external
recognition as a purposive entity (domain), clarity about a
division of labor (tasks), human and material resources and
the conjoined actions of both individuals and larger social
units (organizations). Their approach has some similarities
with ours, yet lacks assumptions how those different
responses can be explained by prior organizational
structure.
Based on research on how organizations process and
institutionalize external jolts to sustainable change
(Greenwood and Hinings 1987, 1988, 1996), Laughlin
(1991) developed four types of organizational reactions to
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environmental disturbances: rebuttal, reorientation, colo-
nialization, and evolution. (1) Rebuttal means a temporal
shift to an alternative design archetype and a return to the
original as the disturbance vanishes. (2) Reorientation
means accepting and integrating the disturbance into newly
shaped designs and subsystems. (3) In colonialization, not
only designs and subsystems change, but also the inter-
pretive (cognitive) schemes. (4) In evolution, the refor-
mulation of interpretive schemes leads to fundamental
reshaping.
Concepts of organizational bricolage and improvisation
(Barrett 1998; Hadida et al. 2015; Moorman and Miner
1998; Pina e Cunha et al. 2015) have been strongly inspired
by the performing arts (Cornelissen 2006). Moorman and
Miner define improvisation ‘‘as the degree to which com-
position and execution converge in time’’ (Moorman and
Miner 1998). High levels of procedural memory thus
contribute to coherent but less novel improvisation; high
levels of declarative memory contribute to coherent and
novel action (Moorman and Miner 1998). Thus, shared
knowledge within an organization can be supportive for
coherence and novelty.
There is also a vast literature on emergency manage-
ment. During operation, scenario planning and conditional
programs often play a crucial role, still providing some
flexibility in operation in contingent situations (Grothe-
Hammer and Berthod 2017). In a study of two emergency
organizations dealing with a hurricane, Carley and Harrald
(1997) show that teams with personnel empowered to act
on basis of their experience outperform teams with per-
sonnel following standard operational procedures. Fur-
thermore, decentralized organizations with more
autonomous teams outperform more hierarchical organi-
zations and seniority and experience play an important
role.
Results yielded by case studies on SWAT teams and
film crews point in a similar direction (Bechky and
Okhuysen 2011). Whenever surprises disrupt expectations,
actors respond by engaging in problem solving and trying
to recreate the order they have lost. They do so in manifold
practices of organizational bricolage: role shifting, reor-
ganizing routines, reordering work, shared task knowledge,
and common workflow expectations (Bechky and Okhuy-
sen 2011). For teams dealing with unexpected incidents,
three major success factors can be identified (Oliver and
Roos 2003): (1) increasing presence, (2) creating a context
for a shared and emotionally grounded identity, (3)
developing a shared set of guiding principles for action.
Some further successful patterns are stockpiling of supplies
and tools. In this respect, social and cognitive processes
play a crucial role, based on a processual memory
(Moorman and Miner 1998) and collective knowledge of
syntax and grammar (Barrett 1998).
To sum up, prior research has contributed many con-
cepts that explain how organizations deal with external
jolts, and which preconditions facilitate appropriate
responses. Findings are partly contradictory: On the one
hand, the literature recommends loosely coupled units and
autonomous teams. Loose coupling helps the organization
to remain functional under stress, as damage can be more
easily isolated (Va¨likangas 2010). On the other hand,
tightly coupled hierarchical organizations with an incident-
command system are seen as extremely viable in stressful
situations, as long as they guarantee sufficient slack for
improvisation (Bigley and Roberts 2001). We will explain
how both modes of structure have their merits in specific
situations. Yet, there is still a significant gap in how prior
decisions that have condensed in structural preconditions
frame the paths of organizational responses.
Theory
Luhmann’s theory with its focus on variety and redundancy
provides an appropriate framework for understanding the
interplay between structure, stability, and flexibility in
organizations (Luhmann 1988, 2000, 2003). It explains this
balance by autopoietic and recursive processes (Bakken
and Hernes 2003), hereby focusing on communication
(Clegg 2015). We will align it with organizational learning
(Luhmann 2000: 74f.), though it doubts that organizations
simply learn by reacting on external triggers, as both their
perception of their environment and their options for
reacting are shaped by internal structures. Recently, sys-
tems theory has gained more attention though empirical
studies based on this theory are scarce. Hendry and Seidl
draw on the concept of an ‘‘episode’’ to explore organi-
zational change (Hendry and Seidl 2003). Grothe-Hammer
and Berthod (2017) study disaster management of a Ger-
man city, focusing on spatial and conditional programs.
Dobusch and Schoeneborn (2015) analyze how fluid social
collectives such as internet communities accomplish
organizationality based on the communicative constitution
of organizations.
Luhmann decided to observe the social world as molded
by social systems, which are assumed to operate autono-
mously, yet with interplay with other systems. Character-
ized as the difference between system and environment
(Luhmann 2006), all social systems are seen as opera-
tionally closed networks of communications, based on
clear boundaries to their environment. Guided by mean-
ing,1 social systems reproduce themselves selectively, in an
autopoietic way from elements previously filtered from an
1 Introducing ‘meaning’ (Sinn in German), Luhmann relates to
phenomenology of Edmund Husserl and Alfred Schu¨tz on the
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over-complex environment (Luhmann 1998, 2012). They
do so by applying communication codes or—in the case of
organizations—decision premises that provide rules for
appropriate communication and action which allow for
continuity of the system’s autopoiesis (Holmer-Nadesan
1997).
Autopoiesis is guided by the system’s internal structures
(Bakken and Hernes 2003; Luhmann 1998). This is not
meant ontologically, but refers to the selection of elements,
i.e., communications, by the system (Seidl and Becker
2006). Social systems observe their environment and react
to it in a self-referential, operationally closed way, based
on their internal structures. Thus, any forms of change are
determined by the system itself. The environment produces
noise and irritations which can only be transformed into
information and further communication if they are ‘‘un-
derstood’’ as meaningful by the system (Ferreira 2014).
The basic elements of social systems are communica-
tions (Luhmann 1986). Organizations, however, are
defined as specific social systems that consist of decisions,
i.e., compact yet contingent communications, seen as
choices among alternatives (Luhmann 2000). Decisions are
thus the basic element of organizational self-production,
and organizations can be understood as social systems
‘‘consisting of decisions, and making the decisions they
consist of by the decisions they consist of’’ (Luhmann
1988).
Decisions are always contingent and related to inherent
uncertainty (Schoeneborn 2011). Luhmann stresses their
paradoxical nature. Decisions are a specific form of
(compact) communication, which, more or less explicitly,
not only convey the chosen alternatives but also a set of
rejected alternatives (Luhmann 2000). To maintain their
autopoiesis, organizations thus need structures, which
‘‘(…) limit the set of possible relations between commu-
nications and therefore transform contingency into a
structured complexity’’ (Besio and Pronzini 2011). There-
fore, decisions form decision premises for further
decisions.
Structures are understood as internal rules and expec-
tations that organize the relations within a social system. In
organizations, decision premises form the organizational
structure. In other words: Organizational structures are
conditions for decisions that need not be verified when
used for further decisions (Luhmann 2000). Luhmann
points to three types of decision premises, which restrict
the leeway for decisions, namely programs, personnel, and
communication channels (Luhmann 2000: 222ff).
Programs delineate the topics about which meaningful
communication is possible. Programs usually contain
objectives, strategies, mission statements, rules and
guidelines, and also statutes, and planning documents to
ensure that an organization cannot decide and communi-
cate about everything in any way. They may be constructed
as conditional programs—Grothe-Hammer and Berthod
(2017) find that those programs are particularly relevant for
disaster management—or as goals. They do not need to be
explicitly formulated; organizational culture and history
also form programmatic expectations. An emergency
organization might regulate that warm food handed out to
refugees must meet quality criteria or not, that all refugees
are medically examined or not, that the provision of
transport or rather a warm atmosphere has top priority.
Communication channels define relations between
internal positions, but also to external actors. They delin-
eate lines of command and accountability and regulate the
social aspect of decision making, including hierarchies,
organizational charts, reporting lines, task distribution, and
all sorts of formal and informal super-/subordination that
guides decision making. For example, these channels might
regulate that only the head of operations or everyone may
decide about services offered. An organization might rely
more on presence, on formal functions or on informal
networks of trust.
Persons refers to the way how an organization con-
structs individual actors (e.g., as soldiers, heroes, geeks)
and how important individual actors are. How important is
it for future decisions which individual actor fills a posi-
tion? Expectations and attributions to individual actors thus
form decision premises. Organizations, for example, might
expect high degrees of motivation and dedication and thus
give ample room to an individual for action; they might
rely strongly on specific persons, like founders, or give
space to everybody who shows a strong presence; the
decision to include new volunteers might be based on trust
or on specific training requirements, etc.
Luhmann also distinguishes between the normative and
the cognitive side of structure (see Fig. 1): Normative
components are not decided explicitly; they remain widely
latent and are less subject to learning. They constitute
organizational culture. (Luhmann 2000).
These three types of decision premises constitute orga-
nizational structure. Apart from selecting decisions, struc-
ture also balances redundancy and variety in organizations
(Luhmann 1988, 1998). Redundancy means the structural
limitation of decisions to reduce complexity and allow for
predictability and regularity. Redundancy provides for an
organization’s consistency and secures its self-reproduc-
tion. Strict programs, for example, contribute to a high
redundancy of tasks. Likewise, clear hierarchies or well-
defined responsibilities will secure redundancy regarding
Footnote 1 continued
subjective and reflexive reconstruction of meaning as compared to
intersubjective meaning (Schu¨tz 1974).
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social relations. Variety means increasing the internal
complexity by permitting a broader range of different
decisions. Vague rules and guidelines, for example, allow
for a high variety of tasks, while openness permitting
everyone to participate allows for variety of ideas and
relations. Therefore, redundancy contributes to stability
and variety to flexibility.
Usually, organizations keep a dynamic balance between
stability and flexibility. If variety prevails, boundaries will
blur and organizations will dissolve. If redundancy pre-
vails, organizations become unable to adapt. There is a
dialectic relationship between self-maintenance and
change: ‘‘Structural change requires self-maintenance.’’
(Luhmann 1984: 474). Organizations can somehow juggle
with different means to ensure the appropriate balance.
Thus, for example, strict procedures for task achievement
allow for variability regarding persons—in assembly lines
persons can be exchanged easily. When tasks cannot be
defined clearly, who holds specific positions becomes
important. Assigning important functions to people with
clearly defined preferences may be a functional equivalent
to narrow programs; and an influential history of an orga-
nization (program) might ensure that only a specific type of
person is selected for specific positions. ‘‘The system
constantly oscillates between constraining and extending
decision possibilities and in this way secures its own
autopoiesis.’’ (Luhmann 2005: 95) Thus, structure either
narrows or broadens flexibility with respect to programs,
communication channels, and persons.
Given that organizational structures are perceived as
conditions for further decisions and that organizations use
different combinations in the balance of redundancy and
variety, these combinations, too, have to deal with the
paradox that alternative decisions can always be made
(Ferreira 2014). This paradox is somewhat mitigated by
perceiving and treating some structures (the redundant
ones) as less open to decisions, as taken for granted, at least
temporarily.
Systems theory instructs us that adaptations of structure
will only take place if they have been observed as inap-
propriate. Then, again, organizations firstly relax those
premises that have already allowed for some flexibility. In
a similar vein, the literature on organizational learning
suggests a cascade of learning (e.g., Argyris and Scho¨n
1978; Fiol and Lyles 1985). Based on the work of Gregory
Bateson (1972), authors distinguish between different
levels of learning: Zero learning is a merely conditioned
response. First-order learning (single loop, adaptive learn-
ing) means correcting errors of choices within a set of
alternatives. Second-order learning (double-loop, reflective
or generative learning) denotes a change in the process of
learning itself and a change in the set of alternatives from
which choice is made (Chiva and Habib 2015: 359f).
Third-order learning (triple loop or deutero learning)
finally focuses on the competency to effectively utilize
single- and double-loop learning.
Those levels of learning are widespread in the OL-lit-
erature (see Chiva and Habib 2015), and encompass per-
sonal experiences and cognitions, shared language and
cognitive maps, shared understandings and attributions,
rules and procedures (Crossan et al. 1999; Crossan et al.
2011) ranging from intuition, interpretation, integration to
institutionalization. Thus, it spans from the individual via
the group to the organizational level (Crossan et al. 1999).
Only in the stage of institutionalization, learning affects
routines, rules, and procedures—thus addressing organi-
zational structure.
Our analytical frame is also inspired by Kreps and
Bosworth (2007) who differentiate between regular and
non-regular tasks and old and new structure. We apply a
wider definition of structure beyond a mere stratification
and clustering of positions. This implies structural change
in any case of non-regular decisions. Likewise, Laughlin
(1991) interprets organizational structure and perception as
intertwined. Again, organizations will firstly try to adapt to
disturbances without fundamentally changing their struc-
ture and interpretive schemes (rebuttal), in case of failure
they will tend to change interpretive schemes which then
leads to a change in design archetypes (reorientation or
evolution); or they will directly alter their structural
archetypes, leading to new interpretive schemes as a con-
sequence (colonization). Overall, according to Greenwood
and Hinings (1993), any major organizational change, or
passage between archetypes, is less common than inertia-
archetype stability.
Fig. 1 Components of
organizational structure in three
dimensions
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Within the frame of systems theory, we focus on deci-
sions and decision premises, as individuals’ cognition is
seen as external to albeit influenced by organizational
structure. Therefore, we slightly reformulate the levels of
learning: In our understanding, (1) first-order learning
concentrates on single decisions within the perceived frame
of decision premises. (2) Second-order learning denotes an
adaptation of decision premises in those domains that allow
for variety and flexibility. (3) Third-order learning, even-
tually, denotes a change in decision premises that have
been perceived as stable safeguards of redundancy.
To sum up, our theoretical considerations suggest an
analytical frame that distinguishes between three types of
responses to unexpected jolts: First, organization may react
within the frame of their decision premises. Second, they
may adapt those domains that already allow for flexibility.
Third, they may alter those domains within their decision
premises that have been pillars of stability. Only the latter
will bring long-term organizational change. To learn more
about these levels of responses, we empirically analyzed
the responses of three Civil Society Organizations (CSOs)
to the so-called refugee crisis of 2015.
Empirical Context, Methods, and Cases
The so-called refugee crisis of 2015 provides the empirical
background of our analysis. On 31 August, some 8000
refugees crossed the Austrian border after the Hungarian
government temporarily opened its borders. After this brief
release, the humanitarian conditions for the refugees
became unbearable in Hungary, and on 4 September, the
situation escalated. Hundreds of refugees started to walk
from Budapest toward the Austrian border. The Austrian
chancellor decided after an agreement with the German
chancellor to open the borders. Within 48 h, approximately
15,000 refugees crossed the border. Between September
and December 2015, almost one million refugees from the
Middle East streamed through Austria. About 90,000
applied for asylum in Austria. Throughout autumn, over
1.3 million overnight stays were counted in the 73 emer-
gency shelters in the city of Vienna alone (Kornberger
et al. 2018). From February 2016 onwards, the influx was
dramatically reduced by controversial political measures.
Public authorities alone were not capable of coping with
the challenge. The vacuum was filled by civil society
activities. CSOs thus played a crucial role in handling the
situation. Without the numerous CSOs, without the thou-
sands of volunteers, and without the public pressure exer-
ted by them, the country would not have been able to
provide shelter, transport and food for so many people
(Simsa 2017). Though many early warnings had indicated
this migration through Central Europe (Syria descending
more and more into civil war; widely chaotic warlike sit-
uations in Iraq and Afghanistan), the situation was exac-
erbated by a cut in funding for the refugee camps in the
Middle East and, for many CSOs, the migration came as an
unexpected jolt.
We started to collect observational and interview data
on how different CSOs dealt with this situation in 2015.
For this specific study, our research was motivated theo-
retically and inspired by the distinct structural forms of
three CSOs that were in the limelight in autumn 2015.
Based on about 60 h of participant observation and 60 h of
one-to-one interviews, we chose three CSOs to illustrate
our theoretical ideas: the Red Cross, Caritas Vienna, and
Train-of-Hope. We selected these CSOs for theoretical
reasons, as they show very distinct organizational struc-
tures regarding their basis of redundancy and flexibility.
For characterizing the CSOs, we also analyzed organiza-
tional charts, mission statements, policy papers, and stan-
dard operational procedures as far as available.
Austrian Red Cross is one of Austria’s largest CSOs in
the field of emergency relief and ambulance services. It has
more than 70,000 volunteers and more than 10,000 paid
employees. Like many CSOs in Austria, it is organized
federally, and during the critical time in 2015, most of its
nine federal organizations were involved. Red Cross has
well-established plans for emergency aid in natural disas-
ters. It has hierarchical structures, following a command-
and-control model (Whittaker et al. 2015). Its volunteers
are well trained as paramedics and officers. During the first
weeks, the inflow of refugees was just another case of
emergency for the organization. It erected tents and pro-
vided the refugees with first aid, catering, medical, and
sanitary services at the borders. Also, soon they started to
run large emergency shelters for refugees.
Caritas Vienna belongs to one of the largest CSOs in
social services. Caritas employs a few thousand paid
employees and more than 10,000 volunteers. It is a highly
diversified social service organization with tasks ranging
from elderly care to the aid for the homeless and women
affected by domestic violence. Caritas is also one of the
strongest advocacy CSOs for the most vulnerable. The
organization is formally structured but—depending on the
respective task fields—allows for different degrees of self-
organization and has rather flat hierarchies. During the
crisis, the organization performed many tasks: They
established emergency shelters, provided supplies to refu-
gees at train stations, organized private accommodations,
childcare, and legal advice.
Train-of-Hope is a grassroots organization that
emerged during the crisis from a group of befriended stu-
dents that had met and built up trust in the context of
student’s protests. It showed a high degree of participation
and spontaneity, rejected hierarchical leadership structures
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and focused on rather narrow tasks. Train-of-Hope pro-
vided refugees with initial assistance at Vienna central
railway station; it worked self-organized over months
and—contrary to the other two organizations—without
public funding. During that time, Train-of-Hope founded
an association with six board members who were respon-
sible for the coordination of activities, and established
several task forces for specific areas of emergency aid (e.g.,
catering, support for children). Train-of-Hope also acquired
many refugees as volunteers.
Beyond analyzing available documents, we utilized
three different sources of qualitative data to avoid single-
method bias and to allow for an open the research process
(see Table 1). We collected data in 2015, 2016, and 2017:
1. In autumn 2015, we conducted 57 semi-structured,
problem-centered interviews with political decision
makers, CSO-managers, volunteers, refugees, and
other actors involved, to get an encompassing picture
of the situation. These data were generated during a
larger-scale research project on the contribution of
civil society during the refugee crisis. From these
interviews, we selected 13 with respondents from the
three CSOs under investigation. We also conducted
60 h of participatory observations, starting very early
in September 2015 at those sites where the CSOs’
operations took place, such as the railway stations in
Vienna and refugee shelters. For this paper, we used
five of these observation notes, mainly with a focus on
the role of persons and communication channels,
which both were well observable. Together with the
documents, they served as a starting point for the
further analysis.
2. In autumn 2016, we collected a second round of three
interviews with the top executives of the three CSOs.
These interviews mainly focused on how the CSOs had
changed in the course of the dramatic events since
autumn 2015.
3. In autumn 2017, we conducted three focus group
discussions with altogether eight representatives of the
three CSOs. Again, we asked retrospectively what
aspects had changed during the crisis, and if/how this
has led to long-term changes. In each group, there was
a top-level executive or (in the case of Train-of-Hope)
a top decision maker, a unit head (not at Train-of-
Hope), and a person in charge of the operations at
street level.
The eleven interviews and the three focus groups were
transcribed. We combined inductive and deductive coding,
thus integrated data-and theory-driven codes (Fereday and
Muir-Cochrane 2006). The inductive coding followed main
themes that emerged in the interviews, e.g., activities,
management decisions, problems and coping strategies,
differences between involved organizations. Further, fol-
lowing a deductive coding strategy (Miles et al. 2014), all
textual data were coded according to main themes. We
particularly looked for decision premises: (1) programs
(standards, criteria, goals, strategies, and conditional pro-
grams such as emergency plans and standard operational
procedures), (2) communication channels (hierarchy,
positions and their relations, departments, division of labor,
and responsibility), and (3) persons (particular contribu-
tions of single actors in terms of resources, capabilities, and
engagement).
The coding process focused on relevant decisions taken
by the CSOs (Boyatzis 1998). By collecting the observa-
tions and descriptions that our respondents regarded as
relevant, we followed suggestions of systems theory to
view the researcher as a second-order observer (Seidl and
Becker 2006). By asking more than one respondent per
CSO at different points of time, by conducting group dis-
cussions and enriching our analyses with documents and
observations, we hope to minimize key informant bias
(Eisenhardt and Graebner 2007; Onwuegbuzie and Leech
2007). Choosing systems theory has methodological
implications: Communications, respectively, decisions and
not actions must be the relevant research objects, applying
operative constructivism without claim of objectivity and
Table 1 Sources of data and method of data collection elements for redundancy in the three selected CSOs
Time Collected data Respondents Selected Respondents
2015 57 qualitative
interviews
Decision makers, volunteers,
refugees
13 qualitative
interviews
Decision makers of the Red Cross, Caritas, Train-of-
Hope
2015 11 participant
observations
Students and faculty members
volunteering
5 observation field
notes
Students volunteering for Red Cross, Caritas, Train-
of-Hope
2016 3 qualitative
interviews
Decision makers 3 qualitative
interviews
Decision makers of Red Cross, Caritas, Train-of-
Hope
2017 3 group discussions 7 decision makers 3 group discussions 3 decision makers of Red Cross, 3 of Caritas, 2 of
Train-of-Hope
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an exploratory attitude toward distinctions regarded as
relevant by the respective system instead of testing
hypothesis.2 ‘‘The ultimate reality is the reality of the
system, which has to construct a network of observations
while continuing to operate’’ (Besio and Pronzini 2011:
20).
We analyzed the data in four steps (see also Tables 3, 4,
5 and 6 in ‘‘Appendix’’ for a summary of steps and find-
ings): (1) For yielding descriptions of prior structure, we
started with documents (organizational charts, regulations,
emergency plans) as far as available and matched them
with reports from participant observation and the first
round of interviews. (2) For grasping primary responses,
we concentrate on observations and interviews that have
been confirmed at least by two sources in 2015. (3) For
structural changes over time, we relied mainly on the
interviews in 2016, but triangulated them with the 2017
group discussions. (4) For longer lasting structural changes,
we utilized the group discussions, concentrating on the
areas of consensus between the participants.
Findings
For all organizations investigated, the massive inflow of
refugees in 2015 was an unanticipated jolt. Even Red Cross
and Caritas that had already started first preparations in
summer did not expect such a massive influx. Civic
engagement increased dramatically, including donations
and volunteerism, the latter creating management chal-
lenges for CSOs (Simsa et al. 2018). Altogether, the
immense humanitarian and logistical challenge was man-
aged by a diverse, polycentric network of organizations,
including political actors and CSOs. Especially at the
beginning, CSOs carried the major burden of emergency
relief activities. The three CSOs investigated started out
from different organizational structures (see also Table 3 in
‘‘Appendix’’).
Red Cross’ structure is hierarchical and incident-com-
mand oriented. Redundancy is guaranteed mainly by pro-
grams and communication channels: clear and sharply
defined emergency plans, a similarly clear-cut schedule of
responsibilities, hierarchies and a line of command, and
well-defined rules for hiring, training, and deploying vol-
unteers. Therefore, it is highly flexible in terms of the
number of involved persons and capable to swiftly deliver
in case of urgency. Whenever an emergency event hap-
pens, Red Cross teams are ready for action.
Caritas at Caritas, redundancy is safeguarded by its
strong, but broad mission statement—‘‘We are here for
people in need—all over the world and around the
clock’’—and the strategies derived from this mission.
Further, for decades, Caritas has been known for its clear
political standpoint on immigration (programs). The top
management is widely autonomous, highly accepted within
the organization, and the president displays charismatic
leadership. Hence, redundancy is also secured by the top
management and its values (persons).
Train-of-Hope this CSO started from scratch. At the
very beginning of the refugee crisis, it was not an organi-
zation at all. Train-of-Hope’s original pillars of redundancy
were friendship relations among the core actors—and their
physical presence (communication channels)—and its
purpose (programs): ‘‘To offer help to refugees in a human
and non-bureaucratic way.’’ The decision to concentrate on
one location also contributed to redundancy (program).
Table 2 gives a summary of the organizations’ decision
premises that are particularly relevant for redundancy and
variety.
From this starting point, we analyzed the initial
responses of the organizations (see also Table 4 in
‘‘Appendix’’).
‘‘Dealing with emergencies is in our DNA—we are used
to that,’’ (RC/2016) said a representative of the Red Cross.
Yet even for the Red Cross, the challenge was described as
unique in terms of size and urgency. It is well prepared to
act spontaneously in sudden crises, but not to maintain
these intensive activities over longer periods. ‘‘Then our
emergency routines started to operate in a dimension we
never had before, but still we were still able to handle this
with standard routines.’’ (FG/2017) Within a few weeks,
the Red Cross not only deployed their regular well-trained
enormous numbers of volunteers, but also their reserve
army of volunteers they had built up since 2007. Thus, the
Red Cross was well prepared, and the initial reaction was
especially flexible regarding time and persons, facilitated
by clear hierarchies: ‘‘We were lucky, whenever our
commanders took control.’’ (FG/2017) Likewise, a signif-
icant expansion of the working hours of the paid staff and
volunteers demonstrated this flexibility. Redundant ele-
ments of organizational structure like emergency plans and
control structures allowed for high flexibility in less rigid
areas, such as the inclusion of new volunteers. Such rules
were explicitly defended by the organization. Examples are
the strict reactions to the unauthorized use of mobile radio
devices by volunteers or the rather modest scope for self-
organization of volunteers.
‘‘We are not an emergency organization,’’ (CA/2016)
said a manager of Caritas. There was no emergency plan,
and it was not even programmed that Caritas had to take
responsibilities at all. Nevertheless, Caritas started with
2 In our findings section, we report our observations of our
respondents’ observations. As a contribution to readability, we do
not explicitly refer to that in any case. In our discussion section, we
also add our interpretations.
Voluntas
123
emergency aid already in August 2015. In September 2015,
the top management decided to take further action. Twenty
paid employees were released from their regular jobs and
transferred to a newly established unit, hundreds of vol-
unteers followed. When the first refugees arrived at one of
Vienna’s train stations, this unit started to operate imme-
diately: self-organized, without clear operational proce-
dures and in a ‘‘learning by doing’’ mode. ‘‘As we saw that
we would need emergency shelters, we built a new struc-
ture for that within a few days—without any clear details of
how to do it’’ said a Caritas top manager (I5/2016), and
‘‘there was a readiness to partly skip the daily business and
jump into this operation, there was the real Caritas feel-
ing.’’ (FG/2017) As redundancy was secured mainly by
history, persons, mission, and strategy, Caritas utilized
variety in terms of hierarchy and other communication
channels. Those were rebuilt within a few days: Staff was
shifted temporarily to the new unit; rules regarding hier-
archy were abandoned. Suspending clear rules for their
integration, now many volunteers were integrated sponta-
neously, sometimes even as team leaders or responsible for
management tasks like the organization of schedules.
‘‘There were strategic decisions that didn’t prove viable in
operation, so we had to readjust permanently, very spon-
taneously.’’ (FG/2017) This caused conflicts and disorien-
tation, yet it was buffered by the strong commitment to the
organizational mission, and the intense involvement of the
top management.
Train-of-Hope started ‘‘with a table and few items of
food and garments’’ but with ‘‘truckloads of personal
concern and emotions—too many emotions’’ (TH/2016). It
applied social media so professionally that it established a
database of 6000 active volunteers within a few days. Yet,
structure was chaotic, ‘‘after day six, the division of labor
was not yet well-established.’’ Thus, communication
channels were very open, and very dependent on personal
relationships. Only after a couple of weeks, volunteer
management allowed for planning ahead at least for the
next day. Volunteers were provided with to-do lists, but
there was still much need and space for improvisation.
Apart from the purpose, the location and the strong bonds
between the core actors, Train-of-Hope is the case with
least redundancy. Individuals acted very autonomously,
ensuring a lot of flexibility in all dimensions. ‘‘There was
no overall leadership, and at the beginning, no one super-
vised the whole operation.’’ (FG/2017) Because of the
absence of clear communication channels, physical pres-
ence was crucial: ‘‘Everyone who had an idea and con-
vinced those around him could do it. If ten guys said ok, the
idea can’t be so bad.’’ (FG/2017) Redundancy was further
maintained by the strong purpose: ‘‘It’s important that all
work that has to be done is done and not that we all stick to
our structure.’’ (FG/2017)
In all three organizations, the initial responses followed
our characterization of first-order learning and built on
already flexible structural elements. Subsequently, how-
ever, these swift reactions were not sufficient to manage
the crisis.
We therefore analyzed further structural changes over
time (see also Table 5 in ‘‘Appendix’’).
The Red Cross was soon confronted with specific
challenges beyond its emergency plans. Besides logistics,
shelter and catering, there was a need for interpreters,
psychosocial support, and for childcare for thousands of
children. Besides, the Red Cross kept their core routine
operations running (ambulances, emergency services).
Therefore, a couple of second-order structural changes
occurred: Volunteers autonomously organized psychoso-
cial support and childcare, using social media, which was
unprecedented in the organization. The Red Cross stuck to
its emergency plan and lines of command, which enabled
high flexibility regarding persons, thus new personnel,
could be hired quickly, in large numbers and sometimes
specific, new language skills (Arabic, Farsi). The organi-
zation temporarily loosened its strict procedure for
recruiting volunteers. Furthermore, interviewees described
Table 2 Major elements for redundancy and variety in the three selected CSOs
Programs Communication channels Persons
Redundancy Variety Redundancy Variety Redundancy Variety
Red
Cross
Mission,
emergency
plans
Expanding working
hours of paid staff and
volunteers
Hierarchy and line of
command recruitment
procedures for volunteers
Large numbers of
volunteers can be
integrated quickly
Caritas Mission,
strategy,
history
Flexible goals derived
from the mission
Lines of reporting Swiftly
establishing
a new unit
Top
management
team
Openness for
volunteers
Train-
of-
Hope
Purpose,
location
Resources and tools
broad and flexible
range of activities
Personal relationships (trust),
presence
Lack of
formal
hierarchy
Founders Openness for
volunteers
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a tendency of more autonomy for operating volunteers and
the loosening of some bureaucratic rules. Nevertheless, the
latter caused conflicts: ‘‘The HR managers did not under-
stand and not accept to sign in new staff members three
days later—as they work in the body of rules, this is central
for their organization, because a rule is a rule and this
makes it difficult.’’ (FG 2017)
Caritas had always been very flexible in designing
communication channels, adapting to new demands. This
allowed for swift changes in structure. A new unit was
founded for refugee emergency aid, an experienced exec-
utive quickly took over its leadership, and new staff was
hired. In the first few weeks, staff members from the var-
ious departments worked voluntarily with the refugees.
Volunteer management became rather flexible, almost like
in Train-of-Hope, yet without their geek-like deployment
of social media. At one train station, ‘‘most people were
external, … only two to four experienced staff members,
the rest completely new … at peaks 150–200 volunteers
per day.’’ Guided by a strong mission, the organization was
flexible in details of programs: ‘‘Suddenly we had a new
error culture.’’ (FG/2017) ‘‘Then we had two regimes in
parallel, emergency care with completely different rules,
and primary care with established standards and a com-
pletely different logic.’’ (FG/2017) The management team
was mainly on spot, thus strengthening their position and
further motivating staff and volunteers. ‘‘Departmental
boundaries blurred, hierarchic structures collapsed, staff
members subverted the usual lines of command and sup-
port, internal committees and meeting structures were
disrupted, because no one was there to attend.’’ (CA/2016)
Almost all of the second-order learning happened in the
domain of flexible communication channels. On the other
hand, new elements of redundancies were also imple-
mented there, such as daily meetings of the two COOs and
regular weekly meetings of representatives of all refugee
aid projects. Apparently, those structural changes did not
harm Caritas’ routine operations in other fields. This might
be due to high motivation and dedication to Caritas’
mission.
Within just a few weeks—like in a pressure cooker—
Train-of-Hope developed some redundancy in communi-
cation channels, such as the legal form of an association, a
board of six members that took coordinative responsibili-
ties and a number of specific units with coordinators, e.g.,
for children, infrastructure, social media, hygienic supply,
and missing people. First, those units operated autono-
mously, loosely coupled, and coordination by the board
was exceptional. Then, redundancy was increased step by
step in all domains: scheduling volunteers, defining tasks,
establishing communication channels. Nevertheless, Train-
of-Hope was still described as flexible in communication
channels and persons. Whoever came to the spot could
define and take over tasks. The emergence of structure
concerned primarily communication channels: founding an
association, establishing units and a steering board, and
starting cooperation with other CSOs. ‘‘So, we thought
over the problems for two nights how to coordinate
transport and interpretation, and then some areas were
defined clearer and clearer, and coordinated, and then a real
linking of the different stations emerged.’’ (FG/2017).
Besides the purpose and the concentration in one venue,
strong personal bonds were still used as a basis for orga-
nizational changes. ‘‘We have our core team, people who
have been there from the beginning. Without them, it
would not work. … If problems occur, we all sit together
and talk—that helps.’’ (TH/2016)
By March 2016, the influx of refugees had become
significantly lower. Our interviews conducted in October
2016 and the focus groups conducted in 2017 aimed at a
retrospective assessment of longer lasting organizational
changes (see also Table 6 in ‘‘Appendix’’).
Among other second-order adaptations, the Red Cross
had hired more additional staff to keep up routine opera-
tions and personnel with new competencies, too, mostly on
a long-term basis. ‘‘Suddenly we had completely different
people in our organization.’’ (RC/2016) Also, it flexibly
expanded fields of operation. Housing for asylum seekers,
for example, was expanded from less than 100 persons
attended before 2015 to a couple of thousand permanent
slots. The Red Cross thus described increased program
variety, which had been a domain of redundancy before. In
the management control systems, something very different
happened: During the crisis, control was relaxed. There
was less paperwork and less reporting, because all
resources were deployed to direct emergency aid. Control
was substituted by trust. Meanwhile, there has been a
backlash in control systems, and executives complain that
reporting duties and paperwork are now more rigid than
before 2015. These changes to programs and communica-
tion channels show that third-order learning obviously
concerned also domains that had been quite redundant
before.
Caritas reported third-order learning after the crisis,
too. They developed emergency plans and started stock-
piling (accommodations, garments, etc.) for upcoming
events. They also founded a new unit for emergency aid,
with staff and a budget that is completely flexible with
regard to tasks and procedures. Further, many new persons
have been kept in the organization, besides some of the
volunteers also asylum seekers who want to engage
voluntarily.
Yet, bureaucracy also rebounded at Caritas. Flexibility
and trust, which helped Caritas to manage the crisis, were
replaced by reporting rules, tolerance for ambiguity and
failure was reduced, and learnings regarding procedures
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were secured: ‘‘I think we haven’t been champions in this
area, quality management, check lists, standards, care
concepts, etc. We fundamentally thought over and con-
cretized it, many things were developed, infrastructure,
minimum standards, etc., so that we don’t have to start all
over again.’’ (C/2016) Further, besides new offers for
spontaneous and episodic volunteers also new rules for the
cooperation with volunteers were established.
Planning for future emergencies increased: ‘‘We estab-
lished a training curriculum. … And we focus on our core
competencies in emergency aid: caring and counseling.’’
(FG/2017) Interviewees from Caritas are convinced that its
structure proved viable during those exceptional months
and that their staff’s motivation had been outstanding but
they also report long-term learning: ‘‘There is a new
awareness for processes within Caritas, to distinguish
between normal operations and emergency situa-
tions.’’ (FG/2017)
A management team member reports that the joint
experiences strengthened ‘‘meaning and trust in Caritas, its
leadership, and the belief that we can handle even the
worst.’’ (CA/2016) Summing up, third-order learning at
Caritas meant mainly increasing redundancy by tighter
emergency programming and by changes in the commu-
nication channels. While Caritas’ strategy as one of the
redundant elements was not altered substantially but rather
strengthened, long-term changes happened in the pro-
gramming, but also in the organizational chart of Caritas.
Thus, both stable and flexible domains of structure were
subject to organizational learning.
Train-of-Hope is a singular case as its primary mission
was accomplished by the end of the inflow of refugees. In
December 2015, after having deployed thousands of vol-
unteers and having delivered 300,000 work hours, Train-
of-Hope shut down its operations at Vienna’s main train
station. The core team was reduced to four persons. Firstly,
they decided not to terminate the organization, but to look
for new fields of activities, all of them related to refugees:
accommodation, language courses, and labor integration.
Additionally, they reflected on their experiences by writing
guidelines for comparable future situations and intensified
planning for future programs. Yet, the further organiza-
tional strategy is still open, and the personal bonds have
dissolved: ‘‘There was a good start, but then the struggles
increased, between different groups, German courses,
House of Hope, and there was a group for the statutes,
because the old statutes didn’t fit any more.’’ (FG/2017)
The conflict finally escalated, and by end of 2017, it was
unclear whether the organization would survive: ‘‘Every-
thing worked well onsite. But at the meta-level, at the
board level, there were extreme differences, regarding the
future direction.’’ (FG/2017) Members could not agree on
new goals and programs, and the communication channels
built up in 2015 dissolved. The organization had secured its
redundancy mainly by the strong purpose, the location,
personal relationships, and by physical presence. In 2017,
Train-of-Hope’s activities were no longer needed at this
location, and the purpose was too narrow to guide new
activities. Furthermore, presence had lost its importance,
and with the start of conflicts between the actors, personal
bonds eroded. The communication channels developed by
second-order learning could not compensate this. Though
this case is exceptional, it also shows that third-order
learning occurred in the domains where the organization
was originally redundant—in the programs and the com-
munication structures. The breakdown of personal friend-
ships and the fact that the purpose became obsolete
accelerated the dissipation of structure.
To conclude, the analysis leads to the following
assumptions regarding the relationship between organiza-
tional structure and responses to unexpected situations:
Structure affects all stages of organizational responses and
organizational learning. Initial responses preferably take
place in dimensions where structure provides variety (first-
order learning). In addition, structural changes as a reaction
to unexpected situations first mainly take place in dimen-
sions where structure provides variety (second-order
learning). If first- and second-order learning is not suffi-
cient, structural changes will also take place in domains
where structure provides redundancy (third-order learning),
which might also result in the dissolution of organizations.
Discussion and Limitations
Prior research on organizational responses to crises has
developed several categories, e.g., rebuttal, reorientation,
evolution, and colonialization (Laughlin 1991); or estab-
lished, extending, expanding, and emergent responses
(Kreps and Bosworth 2007). Most of this work is grounded
in organizational learning theories. Empirical research on
organizational responses to the unexpected is still scarce
and concentrates on team responses (Bechky and Okhuysen
2011) to rare events (Christianson et al. 2009; Weick
1993). Yet, it hardly explains how structural characteristics
relate with different responses. Our research shall fill this
gap.
The so-called refugee crisis of 2015 provides the
empirical background for our analysis of organizational
responses in relation to structure. We selected three CSOs
with very different structures regarding redundancy and
flexibility.
As a theoretical framework, we chose Luhmannian
systems theory, in particular its concepts of organizational
structure and decision premises: programs, communica-
tions channels, and persons. Though this theory is far from
Voluntas
123
structural determinism, it claims that organizations will
establish strategies and responses to unexpected events that
are channeled by structural conditions perceived by deci-
sion makers of the organization. The self-reproducing
nature of structures and routines makes them inherently
resistant to externally imposed change (Grinyer and
McKiernan 1992; Hendry and Seidl 2003). With this con-
cept of decision premises, we combined and slightly
reformulated the organizational learning framework to
analyze responses and learning modes over time.
To secure their autopoiesis, organizations will not only
oscillate between constraining and extending decision
possibilities (Luhmann 2005), but they will do this guided
by their specific balance of redundant and variable ele-
ments in their structure. In this vein, organizations will
hesitate to relax redundant elements as long as they can
respond in more flexible domains. To be open for change in
one domain requires redundancy in others (see for the
interplay between openness and closeness Dobusch et al.
2017).
Our findings widely support this theoretical assumption.
The initial responses of CSOs were spectacular in Austria:
Thousands of people were attended at borders or train
stations; many emergency shelters were set up within days,
thousands of volunteers were coordinated. Yet, those
responses did not change the overall balance of redundancy
and variety of the involved organizations. The Red Cross
used its temporal flexibility to cope with the unexpected by
means of quick reactions based on very clear programs, and
an expansion of working hours. Caritas relied on its flexi-
bility regarding hierarchy, other communication channels,
and content; it thus also swiftly included unaffiliated,
spontaneous volunteers. Train-of-Hope relied on a strong
and narrow purpose, and on personal bonds to react very
flexible with respect to communication channels, and the
recruitment of new personnel.
In a second phase, structural adaptations also occurred
in the domains of flexibility. The Red Cross kept its strict
procedures but established restricted zones of autonomy for
volunteers in certain task areas beyond the organization’s
core competencies. Additional staff members were recrui-
ted. Caritas utilized its flexibility of communication chan-
nels to allow for more spontaneous work, like temporal
changes to hierarchic structures or meeting regulations,
crucial roles, and responsibilities. A specific unit for
emergency aid was founded, and at most sites, leadership
roles for volunteers were established. Train-of-Hope kept
its tight coupling on personal stability and purpose but
implemented structural changes in communication chan-
nels by establishing new formal rules and a certain
hierarchy.
In a third phase, after the urgency of the crisis had
finally ceased, the organizations partly fell back into old
routines. Most of the short-term and medium-term changes
were temporary and did not affect the long-term balance of
redundancy and variety. However, sustainable structural
adaptations that affected formerly redundant domains were
reported, too. At the Red Cross, parts of the new staff were
kept permanently, and with the expansion into housing for
asylum seekers, new content has been integrated perma-
nently. Caritas also sustainably altered decision premises
by introducing stricter emergency plans and by founding a
new unit to serve as a very openly designed organizational
reserve for unexpected crises. Interestingly, both organi-
zations had eased control and bureaucracy at the peak of
the crisis. Afterward, regulations were made even stricter
than before. Train-of-Hope, which had managed a high
workload due to stability in personal relations and a very
strong and clear purpose, reduced personnel significantly,
tried to change its field of activity, and finally drifted
toward dissolution; in other words, it annihilated its domain
of redundancy.
Our findings contribute to various strands of research.
From an organizational learning perspective, our findings
show that responses utilized all three levels of organiza-
tional learning. In their initial, first-order learning, the
organizations relied on redundant elements of structure to
secure their ability to act flexibly. Second-order learning
happened only when first-order learning was not sufficient,
and modifications to decision premises were enacted pre-
dominantly in domains where structure had allowed for
flexibility before. Third-order learning, however, was
triggered by the crisis, but not implemented until the
organizations came into a quieter and steadier environ-
ment. Thus, we not only detected the forms of responses
that the prior literature suggested (Kreps and Bosworth
2007; Laughlin 1991), but also some typical sequence in
learning types.
Success and performance of CSOs are mainly a con-
struction of stakeholders (Herman and Renz 1997). Nev-
ertheless, during the so-called refugee crisis, all three
organizations were rated to be quite successful in dealing
with the unexpected—not only by our interviewees, but
also by policy makers and a broader public (Kornberger
et al. 2018). Therefore, in the first phase of a jolt, keeping
the organization’s particular balance of redundancy and
variety might be a recommendable strategy, if not an
inevitable consequence of organizational structure. Orga-
nizations were flexible where they were used to be flexi-
ble—and they protected the domains that ensured stability
and security. In other words, when the world is turning
upside down, organizations stick to their structural core
competencies regarding redundancy and variety. Thus,
what only at first sight seemed to be mere improvisation
(e.g., Pina e Cunha et al. 2015), was somehow shaped by
organizational structure. While unexpected jolts may work
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as unfreezing events for organizations (Carley and Harrald
1997), they did not unfreeze all elements, first and mid-
range reactions did not affect the stable domains of orga-
nizational decision premises.
Hence, organizations’ capacity to respond to the unex-
pected relies on an appropriate interplay between flexibility
and stability (Dobusch et al. 2017). While common sense
would expect that organizations with flexible structures
would be better prepared to react to jolts, we found that it
was not flexibility alone that counts, but the type of flexi-
bility. While it was also argued, that tightly coupled hier-
archical organizations are better prepared for stressful
situations (Bigley and Roberts 2001), we found that this
might be only true if the organization had previously relied
strongly on its hierarchy and the unexpected events fit in its
conditional programs (Grothe-Hammer and Berthod 2017).
The prior literature has discussed whether unexpected
events are opportunities for organizational learning (Carley
and Harrald 1997), or rather, if their uniqueness impedes
organizational learning (Starbuck 2009). We take a dif-
ferent standpoint in line with systems theory, as we argue
that learning of organizations depends not so much on
external incidents, but mainly on internal structure. While
the external incident was more or less the same for all
organizations, their responses were different. They did not
primarily respond to this external incident, but to their
internal way to understand it, process it, and respond to it.
Furthermore, one of our cases shows that third-order
learning can terminate an organization. If essential
domains of redundancy and stability are loosened with no
stabilizing equivalent, the organization falls apart. Having
accomplished the primary mission, third-order learning
might include the dissolution of the organization.
Our results also support the view that improvisation
depends on structure. In our cases, we have found all the
activities and competencies identified as essential for
improvisation by prior research (Bechky and Okhuysen
2011; Oliver and Roos 2003): role shifting, redundancy in
task knowledge, reorganizing routines, reordering work,
shared task knowledge, common workflow expectations,
increased presence, creating a shared and emotionally
grounded identity, and a shared set of guiding principles for
action. Moreover, we show that these prerequisites for
improvisation depend on the organizational decision pre-
mises. If persons in the form of leaders play a core role for
redundancy, they must be physically present on site, as was
the case with Caritas. If programs are crucial, e.g., in form
of emergency plans, common workflow expectations and
shared task knowledge guarantee effective improvisation,
as was the case with the Red Cross. Role shifting and
redundant task knowledge were especially important for
Caritas and Train-of-Hope, because they had not developed
plans and routines. Thus, we argue that improvisation
relates to structural preconditions. Even in turbulent envi-
ronments and in situations of dramatic change, organiza-
tional responses are basically self-referential.
Our research has many limitations. First, we analyzed
only three cases. Though their selection was based on
theoretical considerations, a caveat remains before gener-
alizing and further research is needed. Second, notwith-
standing our argumentation of second-order organizational
observations and decisions by communicating with influ-
ential members, our methodology has limitations. Our case
selection was not only inspired by theory but also by our
first observations and interviews in 2015. Our findings,
however, are strongly inspired by subsequent interviews
and group discussions and thus by the descriptions of
CSOs’ decision makers. Nevertheless, the longitudinal
research design allowed for valuable insights. Therefore,
we hope that our investigation might serve to motivate
further and more intensive research on the interplay of
structure and organizational learning. In a world of rising
complexity with a growing probability of crises, a deeper
understanding of the coping strategies of organizations is
important not only for organizational scholars, but also for
practitioners.
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Table 3 Intital structure—data sources and findings. Sources: Web-based documents (RC, Caritas), 13 interviews (2015), participant obser-
vation protocols (2015)
Programs Communication channels Persons
Perceptions of initial structure
Red Cross Clear mission
Emergency plans
Standard routines
Hierarchical
Incident-command oriented
Clear responsibilities
Defined rules for volunteers
Flexible regarding the integration of
persons
Caritas Strong and broad mission
History: clear political standpoint on
immigration
Flat hierarchies
Flexibility regarding how to carry out
mission
Charismatic leadership
Strong and accepted management
team
Shared values
Train-of-
Hope
Clear purpose
Focus on one location
Personal relations
Presence
Not formalized
No structure
Social media as constitutive for taking
part
Initial group of friends
Very open relations to new volunteers
Criterion: mentioned by at least 2 sources
Elements safeguarding redundancy in bold letters
Table 4 First-order learning—data sources and findings. Sources: 13 interviews (2015), 5 field notes of participant observation
Programs Communication channels Persons
Perceptions of first-order learning (initial responses)
Red
Cross
Activities followed mission and
emergency plans
Applying standard routines
Strong hierarchy
Control structures
Little self-organization of volunteers
Flexible regarding time and persons
Expansion of working hours
Activating of reserve army of
volunteers
Caritas Taking over new tasks, based on
mission and history
Readjustment of strategic decisions
Caritas feeling
Swift change in structure (new tasks forces,
hierarchies, responsibilities)
Self-organization of Volunteers (including
management tasks)
Rules for integration of volunteers suspended
Strong and accepted leaders
Incorporation of many new volunteers
Trust among staff
Expansion of working hours based on
high motivation
Train-of-
Hope
Day-to-day decisions oriented on
purpose
Focus on work not on structure
Task-pressure enhanced productivity
Personal relationships and physical presence
crucial
Improvisation
No overall leadership
High external pressure
No hierarchy
Individuals acted autonomously
Core team emerged
Completely open regarding new
persons
Criterion: mentioned by at least two sources
Decisions challenging domains of redundancy in bold letters
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Table 5 Second-order learning—data sources and findings. Sources: interviews with three top executives (2016)
Programs Communication channels Persons
Perceptions of second-order learning (structural changes)
Red
Cross
New tasks (interpreters, psychosocial
support, childcare)
Partial self-organization of volunteers
Use of social media
Partial relaxation of rules (e.g., regarding
recruiting)
Emergency plan and lines of command kept but
control relaxed
Flexible integration of new (paid
and unpaid) staff
New types of personnel
Caritas Strong mission kept but flexibility in
details of programs
New error culture
New unit formed
New leaders (based on loosened requirements)
Flexible volunteer management
Blurring of departmental boundaries
Looser rules in emergency care
Lines of command flexibilized
The presence of management team
Daily meetings of involved staff
New (paid and unpaid) staff
Integration of large numbers of
spontaneous volunteers
Train-of-
Hope
No changes in location
Purpose further strengthened
Expansion of tasks in line with
mission
Some formalization
Development of communication channels (to-do
lists, defined tasks responsibilities)
Strong personal bonds—core team
Some formalization regarding
membership
Still very flexible regarding
persons
Criterion: Validated by group discussions (2017)
Changes concerning former domains of redundancy in bold letters
Table 6 Third-order learning—data sources and findings. Sources: 3 focus group discussions (2017), related to interviews with top executives
(2016)
Perceptions of third-order learning (longer lasting structural changes)
Red
Cross
New tasks
Significant expansion of some
fields of operation
New projects
Increased program variety
Higher budgets for refugee
integration
Backlash in control systems (standardized
briefings, checklists, instruments for
cooperation)
Strengthened cooperation with other organizations in
the field
New distribution of staff between departments
New type of personnel—competencies,
origin, experiences (‘‘crises-hoppers’’)
New staff on long-term basis
Caritas New tasks
Plans for future emergencies
(instead of broad mission)
Focus on core competencies
New error culture and
standards
New completely flexible unit for future crises
Stronger bureaucracy (rules for reporting,
cooperation with volunteers)
New organization units
Closing units
Strengthened meaning, trust, bonds
Many asylum seekers engage voluntarily
Some volunteers kept for different fields
New staff on long-term basis
Train-
of-
Hope
Primary task completed
Purpose lost
Search for new fields of
activities
Guidelines for comparable situations developed
Personal bonds dissolved
Conflicts about power relations, statutes,
regulation
Most volunteers left
Emotionalization of relations
Criterion: consensus
Changes concerning former domains of redundancy in bold letters
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